1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:11,119 --> 00:00:13,409 Good morning , Joel . Good morning . 3 00:00:13,909 --> 00:00:15,729 Hey Joel . Hey there . 4 00:00:27,290 --> 00:00:28,959 Yeah . Uh 5 00:00:32,529 --> 00:00:34,689 Joel , get in here . 6 00:00:38,689 --> 00:00:40,580 We've been hacked , hacked 7 00:00:49,669 --> 00:00:53,029 Joel . Joel . 8 00:00:53,849 --> 00:00:57,790 Snap out of it . Get to your station . 9 00:00:58,049 --> 00:00:59,680 Sorry , sorry . 10 00:01:07,059 --> 00:01:10,080 My project , I work all week on that . 11 00:01:17,370 --> 00:01:19,910 What was that ? What's going on ? 12 00:01:25,970 --> 00:01:26,809 Oh , no . 13 00:01:35,629 --> 00:01:36,629 Yeah , 14 00:01:40,040 --> 00:01:42,080 you shall not pass . 15 00:01:51,379 --> 00:01:53,800 And our I T team was able to find some 16 00:01:53,809 --> 00:01:55,698 malicious code and shut it down . 17 00:01:55,910 --> 00:01:57,966 Initial forensics seemed to indicate 18 00:01:57,966 --> 00:02:01,139 that no data was taken . What was the 19 00:02:01,150 --> 00:02:02,949 goal ? Then any ideas 20 00:02:06,209 --> 00:02:08,265 could be just testing our response , 21 00:02:08,265 --> 00:02:10,320 but we won't be sure for a couple of 22 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:12,630 days when forensics wraps up . Are we 23 00:02:12,639 --> 00:02:14,919 doing anything to enhance security on 24 00:02:14,929 --> 00:02:17,410 our systems ? In case it happens again , 25 00:02:17,759 --> 00:02:20,399 the team is working that now additional 26 00:02:20,410 --> 00:02:22,743 anti intrusion measures are being added . 27 00:02:22,860 --> 00:02:25,259 Software updates are being pushed short 28 00:02:25,270 --> 00:02:27,326 term . Everybody should change their 29 00:02:27,326 --> 00:02:29,326 passwords . A hardware update would 30 00:02:29,326 --> 00:02:31,214 help us as well . But I know that 31 00:02:31,214 --> 00:02:33,381 wasn't prioritized this year . Do what 32 00:02:33,381 --> 00:02:35,492 you can for now and we'll take a look 33 00:02:35,492 --> 00:02:37,659 at the budget immediately to see where 34 00:02:37,659 --> 00:02:39,881 we can adjust . How bad could this have 35 00:02:39,881 --> 00:02:42,048 been ? Remember when that fishing scam 36 00:02:42,048 --> 00:02:44,048 happened a few years back ? Fishing 37 00:02:44,048 --> 00:02:46,103 Pete opened that email and was duped 38 00:02:46,103 --> 00:02:48,326 into revealing personal or confidential 39 00:02:48,326 --> 00:02:50,214 information and a scammer used it 40 00:02:50,214 --> 00:02:52,479 illicitly . Right . The Pete thing . 41 00:02:52,960 --> 00:02:55,127 I'm sorry . It's been a long morning . 42 00:02:55,850 --> 00:02:58,330 Look , that was just Pete's information 43 00:02:58,339 --> 00:03:00,419 that got taken . It could get a lot 44 00:03:00,429 --> 00:03:02,550 worse than that . Imagine what would 45 00:03:02,559 --> 00:03:04,670 happen if everybody's information had 46 00:03:04,670 --> 00:03:06,837 been stolen . Like the whole company's 47 00:03:06,837 --> 00:03:09,003 information . Absolutely . These cyber 48 00:03:09,003 --> 00:03:11,259 threats can be innate or man made , 49 00:03:11,270 --> 00:03:12,770 they can be intentional or 50 00:03:12,770 --> 00:03:15,070 unintentional , but they are always 51 00:03:15,080 --> 00:03:17,210 detrimental to systems that are 52 00:03:17,220 --> 00:03:19,179 dependent on or operate through 53 00:03:19,190 --> 00:03:22,089 cyberspace or cyber domain . This 54 00:03:22,100 --> 00:03:24,433 doesn't seem like fishing Joel . I know . 55 00:03:24,433 --> 00:03:26,770 And that worries me . You see this kind 56 00:03:26,779 --> 00:03:28,557 of thing a lot with attempts at 57 00:03:28,557 --> 00:03:29,946 intrusion and sabotage . 58 00:03:33,330 --> 00:03:35,529 Yeah . Pushed 59 00:03:39,350 --> 00:03:42,309 Mr Frank that 60 00:03:45,160 --> 00:03:48,360 even this uh 61 00:03:52,330 --> 00:03:53,497 keep away from her . 62 00:04:13,839 --> 00:04:17,789 Now choose this certificate . Ok . Now , 63 00:04:17,799 --> 00:04:21,440 try to open your email . Ah , 64 00:04:21,450 --> 00:04:23,920 great . Sorry about that . Non , thanks 65 00:04:23,929 --> 00:04:25,540 for your help . No problem . 66 00:04:28,529 --> 00:04:32,269 Wait , that's not right . Non . 67 00:04:32,779 --> 00:04:34,168 Non , what's happening . 68 00:04:37,059 --> 00:04:37,899 No , 69 00:04:43,010 --> 00:04:46,209 Joel , we know , I don't know how they 70 00:04:46,220 --> 00:04:48,220 got through the new firewalls . Did 71 00:04:48,220 --> 00:04:50,387 they gain access to anything ? I don't 72 00:04:50,387 --> 00:04:51,387 know yet . We , 73 00:05:01,299 --> 00:05:03,299 but we still don't know who's doing 74 00:05:03,299 --> 00:05:05,243 this . Not yet . How much are they 75 00:05:05,243 --> 00:05:08,260 asking for ? 600 stick coin dix coin ? 76 00:05:08,369 --> 00:05:11,250 It's a Cryptocurrency . How much is 77 00:05:11,260 --> 00:05:14,649 that ? About $30 78 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:17,630 million ? Oh , no , that's crazy . 79 00:05:17,640 --> 00:05:20,380 Sarah . That will put us deep and red 80 00:05:20,390 --> 00:05:23,779 this quarter boss . She's right . We'll 81 00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:25,957 be cash negative for a long time if we 82 00:05:25,957 --> 00:05:27,957 pay . Not to mention that once this 83 00:05:27,957 --> 00:05:30,068 went viral , our stock took a massive 84 00:05:30,068 --> 00:05:32,068 hit . Look , I know nobody wants to 85 00:05:32,068 --> 00:05:34,179 hear this but we're way beyond damage 86 00:05:34,179 --> 00:05:36,679 control . I think we should just pay . 87 00:05:37,029 --> 00:05:39,149 It's the path of least resistance . 88 00:05:39,160 --> 00:05:41,489 Sure . But I've read about these types 89 00:05:41,500 --> 00:05:43,722 of attacks and we could be dealing with 90 00:05:43,722 --> 00:05:46,380 this for months , paying the ransom 91 00:05:46,390 --> 00:05:48,600 would solve this right away . But I 92 00:05:48,609 --> 00:05:51,450 know Sarah , I know this might not stop 93 00:05:51,459 --> 00:05:53,809 another attack or they may not even 94 00:05:53,820 --> 00:05:56,589 decrypt everything in the short term . 95 00:05:56,600 --> 00:05:58,559 It's the right thing to do . I've 96 00:05:58,570 --> 00:06:00,500 already reached out to the FBI . 97 00:06:01,029 --> 00:06:03,029 They're the lead federal agency for 98 00:06:03,029 --> 00:06:04,807 investigating cyber attacks and 99 00:06:04,807 --> 00:06:07,940 intrusions . The FBI . You don't think 100 00:06:07,950 --> 00:06:10,269 that's a little premature . Now we 101 00:06:10,279 --> 00:06:12,446 alert them any time this sort of thing 102 00:06:12,446 --> 00:06:14,446 happens . I don't know who is doing 103 00:06:14,446 --> 00:06:16,612 this , but any adversary would look to 104 00:06:16,612 --> 00:06:18,501 exploit gaps in our information , 105 00:06:18,501 --> 00:06:20,839 security networks and intelligence . 106 00:06:21,339 --> 00:06:22,980 The FBI collects and shares 107 00:06:22,989 --> 00:06:25,100 intelligence and engages with victims 108 00:06:25,100 --> 00:06:27,267 while working to unmask the people and 109 00:06:27,267 --> 00:06:29,359 groups that commit cybercrimes . The 110 00:06:29,369 --> 00:06:31,200 FBI will also work with federal 111 00:06:31,209 --> 00:06:33,480 counterparts , foreign partners and the 112 00:06:33,489 --> 00:06:35,711 private sector to make sure that we can 113 00:06:35,711 --> 00:06:37,839 close any gaps to protect ourselves 114 00:06:37,850 --> 00:06:40,072 better . I'm sure we'll be hearing from 115 00:06:40,072 --> 00:06:42,070 them soon . I'll call an emergency 116 00:06:42,079 --> 00:06:44,301 session and see what the board wants to 117 00:06:44,301 --> 00:06:46,523 do . Mark , why don't you work with non 118 00:06:46,523 --> 00:06:48,635 Joel and I T in order to come up with 119 00:06:48,635 --> 00:06:50,579 short term plans to implement more 120 00:06:50,579 --> 00:06:52,579 security measures to make sure this 121 00:06:52,579 --> 00:06:53,857 doesn't happen again . 122 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:06,980 We need to upgrade all of this . Not 123 00:07:06,989 --> 00:07:09,045 all of it . Most countermeasures are 124 00:07:09,045 --> 00:07:11,267 software based , but a lot of these are 125 00:07:11,267 --> 00:07:13,211 outdated and could be replaced are 126 00:07:13,211 --> 00:07:15,267 older systems more vulnerable . They 127 00:07:15,267 --> 00:07:17,190 can be . But what we do here is 128 00:07:18,980 --> 00:07:21,091 sorry , Mark , wait just one minute . 129 00:07:21,510 --> 00:07:22,329 No worries . 130 00:07:47,290 --> 00:07:47,750 Hm . 131 00:07:51,149 --> 00:07:53,420 For more information on cyber threats , 132 00:07:53,429 --> 00:07:56,880 visit our website at C dot edu 133 00:07:59,929 --> 00:08:01,873 if you or someone , you know , has 134 00:08:01,873 --> 00:08:04,100 experienced a cyber threat detail , the 135 00:08:04,109 --> 00:08:06,331 incident in writing , report it to your 136 00:08:06,331 --> 00:08:08,929 direct supervisor and your security and 137 00:08:08,940 --> 00:08:10,640 insider threat offices .