1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:21,530 --> 00:00:24,829 Rick , what is unexpected capacity ? 3 00:00:35,259 --> 00:00:37,930 I'm not sure . Maybe it's a hold over 4 00:00:37,939 --> 00:00:40,860 from the old guard . Let's look at some 5 00:00:40,869 --> 00:00:41,925 older statements . 6 00:00:48,040 --> 00:00:51,869 Mark got a minute . Sure thing . What's 7 00:00:51,880 --> 00:00:55,560 up ? Carter noticed something 8 00:00:55,569 --> 00:00:57,680 strange with some of the financials . 9 00:00:57,680 --> 00:00:59,791 These are popping up out of nowhere . 10 00:00:59,791 --> 00:01:01,791 Rick asked me to look at some older 11 00:01:01,791 --> 00:01:03,902 records to see if it was new or not . 12 00:01:03,902 --> 00:01:06,290 Did you find anything ? Yeah , they 13 00:01:06,300 --> 00:01:08,411 started showing up a few weeks before 14 00:01:08,411 --> 00:01:10,633 Sarah took over from the O CEO . You've 15 00:01:10,633 --> 00:01:12,856 never seen this before , Rick ? I don't 16 00:01:12,856 --> 00:01:15,440 think so , but you know how cross eyed 17 00:01:15,449 --> 00:01:17,282 I can get while looking at these 18 00:01:17,282 --> 00:01:19,449 balance sheets , leave these with me . 19 00:01:19,540 --> 00:01:21,762 I'll take a look tonight and see what I 20 00:01:21,762 --> 00:01:24,096 can find . Maybe Sarah change something . 21 00:01:24,250 --> 00:01:26,139 We should let her know as soon as 22 00:01:26,139 --> 00:01:28,139 possible . All right , give me some 23 00:01:28,139 --> 00:01:30,361 time to have a look before we bug her . 24 00:01:30,361 --> 00:01:32,139 She's got enough on her plate . 25 00:01:47,879 --> 00:01:48,879 Hm . 26 00:02:12,949 --> 00:02:14,893 What's going on with Carter ? Rick 27 00:02:14,893 --> 00:02:16,949 thinks he made a mistake while going 28 00:02:16,949 --> 00:02:19,250 through some old statements . I think 29 00:02:19,259 --> 00:02:21,426 we caught him trying to manipulate the 30 00:02:21,426 --> 00:02:23,537 data to gain access to our accounts . 31 00:02:23,537 --> 00:02:25,720 Rick's keeping him around against my 32 00:02:25,729 --> 00:02:28,050 better judgment particularly since the 33 00:02:28,059 --> 00:02:30,360 ransomware attack . But Rick thinks 34 00:02:30,369 --> 00:02:32,740 giving the kid a second chance is how 35 00:02:32,750 --> 00:02:36,460 to proceed . Really ? It's my fault . 36 00:02:36,970 --> 00:02:38,970 I mean , Rick hired him based on my 37 00:02:38,970 --> 00:02:40,979 recommendation . He looked great on 38 00:02:40,990 --> 00:02:43,619 paper . I'll have Rick brief me later . 39 00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:47,759 Don't be too hard on yourself . We 40 00:02:47,770 --> 00:02:50,240 should keep going . Yes , ma'am . Lead 41 00:02:50,250 --> 00:02:50,720 the way 42 00:02:56,929 --> 00:02:59,151 what's going on . The ransomware attack 43 00:02:59,151 --> 00:03:01,429 was more sophisticated than we thought . 44 00:03:01,429 --> 00:03:03,485 So the FBI came out to brief non and 45 00:03:03,485 --> 00:03:05,540 how things were going on their end , 46 00:03:05,540 --> 00:03:09,330 they should be finishing up . So it 47 00:03:09,339 --> 00:03:11,450 seems very troubling that you are hit 48 00:03:11,450 --> 00:03:13,561 with two attacks in such a close time 49 00:03:13,561 --> 00:03:17,080 frame . Sarah , this is agent Johnson 50 00:03:17,089 --> 00:03:20,130 from the FBI and agent , also 51 00:03:21,169 --> 00:03:23,869 agent Johnson . Thank you both for 52 00:03:23,880 --> 00:03:26,289 coming out . How was your discussion ? 53 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:29,240 I learned a lot about the attack and 54 00:03:29,250 --> 00:03:31,472 their team picked up on a lot of things 55 00:03:31,472 --> 00:03:33,528 that we missed . Do you know who did 56 00:03:33,528 --> 00:03:36,619 this ? Not yet ? This was more complex 57 00:03:36,630 --> 00:03:39,110 than we first thought . A big concern 58 00:03:39,119 --> 00:03:41,230 of ours is that you were hit with the 59 00:03:41,230 --> 00:03:43,286 initial hack and then the ransomware 60 00:03:43,289 --> 00:03:47,210 attack in quick succession . Nan also 61 00:03:47,220 --> 00:03:49,276 mentioned that you recently found an 62 00:03:49,276 --> 00:03:51,750 issue with some financial reports . The 63 00:03:51,759 --> 00:03:54,020 program was duplicating information and 64 00:03:54,029 --> 00:03:56,251 it was throwing an error we hadn't seen 65 00:03:56,251 --> 00:03:58,418 before . I found the workaround online 66 00:03:58,418 --> 00:04:00,640 and was able to fix it . And then n and 67 00:04:00,640 --> 00:04:02,862 her team updated the software . We were 68 00:04:02,862 --> 00:04:05,229 a few versions behind . Great . That's 69 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:07,296 what we like to hear . We're running 70 00:04:07,296 --> 00:04:09,710 over and I don't wanna take up too much 71 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:11,942 more of your time . Once we get back to 72 00:04:11,942 --> 00:04:13,998 the office , I'll send nan some more 73 00:04:13,998 --> 00:04:16,109 information and then she should brief 74 00:04:16,109 --> 00:04:18,276 your team on what we discussed today . 75 00:04:18,276 --> 00:04:20,859 That sounds great . Thank you team . 76 00:04:20,869 --> 00:04:23,036 Let's let the agents get on with their 77 00:04:23,036 --> 00:04:22,420 day . 78 00:04:36,619 --> 00:04:40,290 When did you get this ? I 79 00:04:40,309 --> 00:04:43,459 decided to treat myself . It's gorgeous . 80 00:04:43,809 --> 00:04:45,587 Where did you get the money for 81 00:04:45,587 --> 00:04:47,309 something like this ? I had an 82 00:04:47,309 --> 00:04:49,529 unfortunate windfall . I'd really 83 00:04:49,540 --> 00:04:53,320 rather not talk about it . MS Evans . 84 00:04:53,470 --> 00:04:55,529 I have agent Johnson holding . Thank 85 00:04:55,540 --> 00:04:58,359 you . Please put him through . Hi , 86 00:04:58,369 --> 00:05:00,480 Agent Johnson . This is Sarah Evans . 87 00:05:00,480 --> 00:05:02,709 Miss Evans . I had a thought after we 88 00:05:02,720 --> 00:05:05,890 left . Ok . What is it ? Have any of 89 00:05:05,899 --> 00:05:08,121 your employees shown any signs of undue 90 00:05:08,121 --> 00:05:10,920 wealth or maybe unannounced or 91 00:05:10,929 --> 00:05:13,151 expensive travel to foreign countries ? 92 00:05:13,239 --> 00:05:15,549 Nothing that I'm aware of . What about 93 00:05:15,559 --> 00:05:18,109 dissatisfied , distracted or 94 00:05:18,119 --> 00:05:21,579 disgruntled employees ? Not off the top 95 00:05:21,589 --> 00:05:24,250 of my head . No , Miss Evans . Do you 96 00:05:24,260 --> 00:05:26,529 think you or your staff would report 97 00:05:26,540 --> 00:05:28,540 any indicators of insider threat if 98 00:05:28,540 --> 00:05:31,829 they saw them insider threat ? I'm not 99 00:05:31,839 --> 00:05:34,450 sure why a threat from inside your 100 00:05:34,459 --> 00:05:36,681 organization is something to consider . 101 00:05:36,681 --> 00:05:38,570 Really it could be someone acting 102 00:05:38,570 --> 00:05:41,089 wittingly or unwittingly . I'll send 103 00:05:41,100 --> 00:05:43,267 some information over to non , there's 104 00:05:43,267 --> 00:05:45,322 a lot of resources I can direct your 105 00:05:45,322 --> 00:05:47,760 team to online courses , webinars . 106 00:05:47,929 --> 00:05:50,096 There's a great website that has a lot 107 00:05:50,096 --> 00:05:52,151 of stuff I'll touch base and let her 108 00:05:52,151 --> 00:05:54,260 follow up with you . Perfect . Thank 109 00:05:54,269 --> 00:05:56,290 you . So much , Agent Johnson . My 110 00:05:56,299 --> 00:05:58,243 pleasure , ma'am . If you think of 111 00:05:58,243 --> 00:06:00,299 anything don't hesitate to reach out 112 00:06:00,299 --> 00:06:01,440 will do . Bye . 113 00:06:04,559 --> 00:06:06,392 Welcome to the Strong Arm Effect 114 00:06:06,392 --> 00:06:08,859 podcast . This is episode one fraud , 115 00:06:08,869 --> 00:06:11,059 the Phantom Menace . I'm your host , 116 00:06:11,070 --> 00:06:14,890 Anara Johnson Fraud . What is it ? What 117 00:06:14,899 --> 00:06:17,177 are the signs ? How can you prevent it ? 118 00:06:17,670 --> 00:06:19,739 Fraud is any activity that relies on 119 00:06:19,750 --> 00:06:21,972 deception in order to achieve a gain of 120 00:06:21,972 --> 00:06:23,972 some sort , internal organizational 121 00:06:23,972 --> 00:06:25,806 fraud . For example , is when an 122 00:06:25,806 --> 00:06:28,109 employee manager or executive of an 123 00:06:28,119 --> 00:06:30,230 organization deceive the organization 124 00:06:30,230 --> 00:06:32,750 itself , think embezzlement , cheating 125 00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:34,760 on taxes and lying to investors and 126 00:06:34,760 --> 00:06:35,600 stakeholders 127 00:06:40,049 --> 00:06:42,271 learn more about the different types of 128 00:06:42,271 --> 00:06:44,660 fraud and view select case studies at 129 00:06:44,670 --> 00:06:48,329 www dot C DS e.edu .